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I. Introduction 
Lyman Johnson has made major contributions in thinking 
about both duty and purpose in corporations.1 He has also been 
                                                                                                     
 * Dorsey & Whitney Chair and Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law 
School. The Author thanks Paul Rubin and participants at the Washington and Lee 
Law Review Symposium, entitled Corporate Law, Governance, and Purpose: A Tribute 
to the Scholarship of Lyman Johnson and David Millon, for helpful comments.  
 1. See, e.g., Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Corporate Officers and the Business 
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one of the very few corporate law scholars to write about the role 
of religious belief in motivating both corporations collectively and 
individual officers and directors within corporations.2 These 
various contributions are interlinked. Johnson has a vision of 
corporations pursuing plural visions of collective goods, not 
limited by the shareholder value maximization norm that has 
come to prevail in thinking about American corporate law. A 
strong moral vision rooted in religious belief underlies that 
project. 
This project is worth exploring from a variety of perspectives. 
After all, the dominant economic approach to corporate law is not 
exactly known for the depth or subtlety of its understanding of 
human psychology and the common good. Religious thought has a 
vast cumulative reservoir of reflection on human good and evil, 
individual and collective. What can we learn by examining 
corporate law from a religious point of view? How does a religious 
understanding of human nature affect an analysis of how 
directors and officers are likely to respond to their fiduciary 
duties? How does a religious understanding of collective action 
and enterprise affect our vision of corporate purpose? If our 
answers to those questions change our understanding of how 
corporations may (or may not) pursue the public interest, how 
does that in turn reflect an analysis of how the state should 
regulate business, and in particular, how it should regulate 
religiously-guided businesses whose core beliefs may in some 
ways conflict with some legal regulations? This Article addresses 
those questions by drawing on three different theologians with 
differing perspectives: Walter Rauschenbusch, Michael Novak, 
                                                                                                     
Judgment Rule, 60 BUS. LAW. 439, 440 (2005) (arguing that the business 
judgment rule “does not and should not be extended to corporate officers in the 
same broad manner in which it is applied to directors”); Lyman Johnson, 
Counter-Narrative in Corporate Law: Saints and Sinners, Apostles and Epistles, 
2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 847, 849 [hereinafter Johnson, Counter-Narrative] 
(discussing the “story” told by corporate law through a “master narrative” and 
“equity’s counter-narrative”); Lyman Johnson, Unsettledness in Delaware Corporate 
Law: Business Judgment Rule, Corporate Purpose, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 405, 408 (2013) 
[hereinafter Johnson, Unsettledness] (exploring “fundamental issues” of 
corporate law relating to the business judgment rule and mandated corporate 
purpose). 
 2. See Lyman Johnson, Re-Enchanting Corporate Law, 1 WM. & MARY 
BUS. L.J. 83, 87 (2010) (exploring the “possible implications of continuing, wide-
spread religious enchantment for the modern corporation”). 
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and Reinhold Niebuhr. The first two of these figures resemble—
but deepen—perspectives already widely developed with 
contemporary corporate law scholarship.3 The third figure, 
Niebuhr, is more novel, and poses some hard questions for 
corporate law scholars of varying perspectives.4 
The Article proceeds as follows: Part II outlines the two 
broad leading secular perspectives that dominate corporate law 
scholarship.5 Most significant is the contractarian approach.6 
This approach assumes individual self-interest as the leading 
motivation of corporate directors, officers, and employees, and 
emphasizes how contractual and market mechanisms can help 
constrain and harness self-interest to produce social benefits with 
only light regulation.7 The contractarian approach has dominated 
American corporate law scholarship since the 1980s.8 A 
subordinate but still significant alternative is what I will call the 
communitarian approach.9 This approach takes a more optimistic 
view of individuals but a less optimistic view of corporations. It 
posits that individuals can be motivated by more other-regarding 
reasons to act, up to a point.10 And it is a good thing too, because 
the approach argues that markets frequently do not work as well 
to harness individual greed as the contractarian approach 
                                                                                                     
 3. See infra Part III.A–B (reviewing the contributions of Walter 
Rauschenbusch and Michael Novak).  
 4. See infra Part III.C (distinguishing Reinhold Niebuhr’s work from the 
other scholars).  
 5. See infra Part II (outlining the contractarian and communitarian 
approaches to corporate law).  
 6. I will sometimes call this the libertarian approach when I want to 
emphasize its normative thrust. It is also commonly called the law and 
economics approach. See Scott R. Peppet, Contractarian Economics and 
Mediation Ethics: The Case for Customizing Neutrality Through Contingent Fee 
Mediation, 82 TEX. L. REV. 227, 230 (2003) (referring to the “contractarian law 
and economics” approach). 
 7. See infra note 51 and accompanying text (providing that the most 
compelling social task of business is to maximize profits).  
 8. See generally FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE 
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1996) (providing the leading classical 
statement of this approach in a relatively pure version). 
 9. I will sometimes call this the progressive approach when I want to 
emphasize its normative thrust. 
 10. See infra notes 57–59 and accompanying text (discussing historical and 
modern evaluations of the communitarian approach).  
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supposes. This suggests both an important role for corporate 
social responsibility, but also for state regulation to guard against 
harms.11 
Part III introduces the three religious perspectives.12 It 
compares and contrasts those perspectives in their understanding 
of individual and collective behavior.13 Walter Rauschenbusch 
was the leading figure of the Social Gospel movement of the early 
twentieth century.14 He emphasized the social nature and goals of 
religion, and reacted strongly against what he perceived as major 
social injustices brought on by industrialization and the growth of 
big businesses during his time.15 He saw persons as sinners but 
able to improve themselves and work for the public good if the 
social environment is reformed.16 The Social Gospel movement 
was closely tied to the Progressive movement in politics, and 
supported the regulatory reforms of Progressivism. I argue that 
this vision fits pretty closely with the modern corporate 
communitarian vision that Lyman Johnson has helped develop. 
Michael Novak is a contemporary Catholic philosopher best 
known for his book The Spirit of Democratic Capitalism.17 He 
gives a religious defense of a relatively conservative, free-market 
approach to economics and corporations.18 Although humans are 
far from purely selfish, markets and free enterprises can usefully 
harness self-interest to benefit the public good in ways that 
economists since Adam Smith have analyzed in detail.19 
                                                                                                     
 11. A leading source for this approach is PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW 
(Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995). 
 12. See infra Part III (exploring concepts of “individual personality and sin, 
the relationship between individuals and the community, and on the role of 
corporations in society”).  
 13. Infra Part III.  
 14. See infra notes 74–78 and accompanying text (describing the influence 
and import of the Social Gospel movement).  
 15. See infra note 72 and accompanying text (detailing the focuses of the 
Social Gospel movement).  
 16. See infra note 77 and accompanying text (discussing Rauschenbusch’s 
conceptions of sin and salvation in terms of corporate practice).  
 17. MICHAEL NOVAK, THE SPIRIT OF DEMOCRATIC CAPITALISM (1982) 
[hereinafter NOVAK, SPIRIT]. 
 18. See id. at 28 (“Democratic capitalism is neither the Kingdom of God nor 
without sin. Yet all other known systems of political economy are worse.”).  
 19. See id. at 113 (discussing Adam Smith’s writings and contribution to 
economic discourse).  
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Corporations are a part of this system, though they also rely upon 
and generate social norms and behavior. A healthy respect for 
seeking profit is fine with Novak, who thus fits pretty well with 
the contractarian vision. 
Our third figure, Reinhold Niebuhr, is harder to peg 
politically and analytically. His Christian realism sees self-
centered pride as a central feature of human existence.20 Persons 
can and do strive to rise above such selfishness, but they can 
never fully succeed. They rise above themselves by acting within 
groups, including economic enterprises, but such collective action 
is morally ambiguous: the groups themselves often become quite 
grasping and greedy vis-à-vis other groups. Niebuhr is thus less 
optimistic about individual character and political organization 
than Rauschenbusch and less optimistic about emergent market 
outcomes than Novak. 
Part IV applies the ideas of these three thinkers to questions 
of corporate duty and purpose.21 As for duty, Rauschenbusch 
provides some support for the communitarian emphasis on norms 
to guide fiduciaries to act faithfully. Novak suggests that internal 
needs and constraints will tend to guide managers, and is 
skeptical about state intervention in the affairs of business.22 
Niebuhr suggests reasons why prideful CEOs may conflate their 
own interests with those of the corporation, without a lot of 
reason to suspect state intervention will change that.23 As for 
purpose, Rauschenbusch gives some reason to hope that 
managers can become stewards to promote the general public 
good (though plenty of reason to be skeptical, too).24 Novak gives 
some reason to believe that a norm of faithfully pursuing the long 
                                                                                                     
 20. See infra note 108 and accompanying text (outlining Niebuhr’s moral 
philosophy).  
 21. See infra Part IV (evaluating the implications of Novak, 
Rauschenbusch, and Niebuhr’s work on corporate purpose and duty).  
 22. See NOVAK, SPIRIT, supra note 17, at 131–33 (discussing the importance 
of managers’ understandings of the operations of a corporation).  
 23. See REINHOLD NIEBUHR, MORAL MAN AND IMMORAL SOCIETY 274–75 
(1932) [hereinafter NIEBUHR, MORAL MAN] (“The interests of the individuals are, 
in other words, never exactly identical with those of their communities.”).  
 24. See WALTER RAUSCHENBUSCH, CHRISTIANITY AND THE SOCIAL CRISIS 386 
(1907) [hereinafter RAUSCHENBUSCH, SOCIAL CRISIS] (opining on government 
interference and whether such interference is an effective method to promote 
moral behavior). 
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term interests of shareholders will benefit the general public.25 
Niebuhr suggests that expecting managers to genuinely pursue 
the general public good is probably expecting too much, while a 
norm of shareholder wealth maximization could push managers 
to harm other interests beyond what is actually even good for 
shareholders.26  
Part V considers regulation and pluralism.27 All three 
perspectives support at least some regulation to constrain 
corporate actions, with Rauschenbusch generally supporting the 
most regulation and Novak the least.28 Niebuhr’s position seems 
rather indeterminate: internal corporate restraint and market 
incentives are unlikely to lead to good behavior most of the time, 
but the political process is not necessarily trustworthy to lead to 
improvements through regulation.29  
As the regulatory state expands, we see more conflicts 
between well-meant rules and the religiously-guided actions of 
some enterprises in a pluralistic world with competing visions of 
the good.30 To what extent should the state provide regulatory 
accommodations when such conflicts arise? That is the issue 
                                                                                                     
 25. See NOVAK, SPIRIT, supra note 17, at 93 (discussing how shareholder 
self-interest acts as a vehicle for maintaining the integrity of a corporation). 
 26. See NIEBUHR, MORAL MAN, supra note 23, at 117–18 (discussing how 
those with privilege justify their self-interest by pointing to the necessity of 
their skills while also denying lower classes opportunities to advance). It is 
perhaps already becoming clear that Christian realism could well be labeled 
Christian pessimism. 
 27. See infra Part V (considering how the approaches of Novak, Niebuhr, 
and Rauschenbusch affect regulations and pluralism as methods of controlling 
corporate behavior). 
 28. Compare MICHAEL NOVAK, TOWARD A THEOLOGY OF THE CORPORATION 26 
(1981) (“The economic system must not become subordinate to the political or 
religious system.”), with RAUSCHENBUSCH, SOCIAL CRISIS, supra note 24, at 386 
(“The present movement for federal and state interference and control over 
corporations . . . is an effort to reassert the ownership and mastership of the 
people and to force these stewards of public powers back into the position of 
public servants.”). 
 29. See NIEBUHR, MORAL MAN, supra note 23, at 20–21 (arguing that the 
power of government would merely replace the power of corporations). 
 30. See David Millon, Communitarians, Contractarians, and the Crisis in 
Corporate Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1373, 1377–81 (1993) (addressing the 
corporate approach of shareholder primacy in comparison to an approach 
focusing on increasing public good). 
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raised so contentiously in the Hobby Lobby case.31 How would our 
three thinkers answer that question? I suspect Novak would 
support fairly expansive accommodation; the answers of 
Rauschenbusch and Niebuhr are less clear, though I find 
elements in the thought of each that supports the position 
favoring some accommodation that both Johnson and I have 
defended.32 
Part VI concludes that we have much to learn from 
Rauschenbusch, Novak, and Niebuhr, and we need not choose 
just one over the other two. In many important ways they 
complement each other. Rauschenbusch and Novak provide fewer 
truly original arguments for corporate law scholars, as they each 
fit pretty neatly within one of the current prevailing 
perspectives.33 Niebuhr does not fit as well, which makes him 
more interesting.34 I think he suggests that we should be less 
confident that either markets, morals, or rules can prevent 
corporations from imposing major harms on internal or external 
constituents.35 Rather, we should perhaps put greater focus on an 
additional set of governance strategies, giving affected persons 
(especially employees) a direct say in decisions that affect them. 
II. Contractarian and Communitarian Approaches 
To understand how the differing theological perspectives 
both fit with and contrast with existing dominant understandings 
of corporate law, it helps to briefly outline the two leading schools 
of thought—contractarian and communitarian. For each school of 
                                                                                                     
 31. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014) 
(deciding whether the Department of Health and Human Services may require 
closely held corporations to provide insurance for contraception in violation of 
the religious beliefs of the owners of those companies). 
 32. See infra Part IV.A (summarizing each theorist’s opinions on changes to 
the corporate law system). 
 33.  See infra Part III.A (detailing Rauschenbusch’s communitarian 
approach); infra Part III.B (outlining the contractarian views of Novak). 
 34. See infra Part III.C (describing Niebuhr’s approach as “Christian 
realism”). 
 35. See infra Part IV.A (suggesting that Niebuhr takes a pessimistic 
approach in that he distrusts power as a whole, rather than one individual 
source of power). 
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thought the analysis starts by considering core assumptions 
about individual interest-seeking behavior. It then moves on to 
consider how each approach understands the regulation of 
self-seeking behavior internally, and how individual behavior 
typically translates into collective outcomes. 
A. Contractarianism 
The dominant way that most American scholars today 
understand corporate law is the contractarian approach, often 
called the law and economics approach, and which I will also 
occasionally refer to as the libertarian approach when I want to 
emphasis its normative thrust. Rooted in Ronald Coase’s classic 
article on the theory of the firm,36 this approach began to get 
traction in corporate law scholarship in the sixties with several 
articles and books by Henry Manne.37 It picked up with articles 
by a variety of scholars in the seventies and eighties, getting a 
classic early statement in The Economic Structure of Corporate 
Law by Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel.38 In varied 
stronger and more diluted forms, the contractarian approach now 
suffuses most American corporate law scholarship.39 
The contractarian approach starts with a vision of the 
individual as rationally seeking to advance her own preferred 
interests.40 At its true core, those interests are assumed to be 
                                                                                                     
 36. See generally R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 
(1937) (arguing that corporations replace contract-based market transactions 
only when doing so would decrease transaction costs). 
 37. See generally HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK 
MARKET (1966) (focusing in part on the effects of different legal rules on trading 
and the difficulty of policing those rules); Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the 
Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110 (1965) (arguing that market 
forces, more than governmental antitrust regulations, decrease the negative 
impacts of mergers). 
 38. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 8, at 1–39 (discussing the 
molding of the corporate form and its reliance on contract analysis). 
 39. See Millon, supra note 30, at 1377 (noting an increase in scholarship 
debating a potential shift from the current shareholder-primacy approach). 
 40. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 8, at 6 (summarizing the 
dynamic of the corporate form as beginning with self-interested managers and 
investors). 
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purely selfish, often focused on financial interests.41 More 
abstract versions of the theory allow for a very broad range of 
interests, which can include promoting the well-being of others.42 
But the self-centered version of the theory typically guides 
thinking within corporate law scholarship. Persons are assumed 
to pursue their interests rationally and effectively, although more 
nuanced versions of the theory allow for various imperfections.43 
In considering agency problems within businesses, this 
approach focuses on properly aligning incentives, so that self-
interested agents will not unduly subordinate the interests of the 
business to their own.44 Compensation, monitoring, governance, 
and reputational mechanisms, along with other contractual and 
market means, help guard against excessive opportunity.45 
Governmental regulation can help, but can easily go too far or not 
properly align incentives.46 Fiduciary duty is a leading form of 
such regulation, but contractarian purists think duty should be a 
default but not mandatory rule.47  
As far as advancing public goods goes, the contractarian 
approach in essence believes in the invisible hand of Adam 
Smith.48 The selfish pursuit of profit by individual actors in the 
market will tend to benefit all.49 Indeed, the contractarians go 
                                                                                                     
 41. See id. (noting that entrepreneurs are driven by the desire to prevent 
personal loss).  
 42. See Millon, supra note 30, at 1378 n.19 (explaining that contractarian 
opinions vary widely on their opinions of social rights and government 
interference in the corporate context). 
 43. See id. (identifying Rawls as one contractarian whose views would 
“resonate strongly with the rights-based views of corporate law 
communitarians”). 
 44. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 8, at 9 (suggesting that unless 
an employee receives “all the rewards of success and penalties of failure,” he 
may lack incentive to fully support the corporation’s venture). 
 45. See id. (“Another way around the difficulty of monitoring the work of 
the firm’s employees is to give each the right to some profits from the firm’s 
success. Each will then work hard and monitor the work of colleagues, lest their 
subpar performance reduce his rewards.”). 
 46. Millon, supra note 30, at 1382.  
 47. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 8, at 90 (noting that 
corporations are “enduring contracts” and that if a contract is written well 
enough, fiduciary duties become unnecessary). 
 48. See ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 37–43 (Seven Treasures 
Publications 2009) (describing how the market limits individual greed). 
 49. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 8, at 4 (“Managers may do 
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beyond Smith in believing this remains true, even adding 
corporations as collective actors within the market system—
Smith himself thought agency problems within joint stock 
companies were generally disabling.50 The full, pure vision tying 
individual self-interest, corporate profit maximization, and the 
general public good is well laid out in Milton Friedman’s classic 
article, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase Its 
Profits.51  
Even Friedman did not believe in a purely laissez-faire 
system.52 There will always be some externalities not captured by 
market prices, so that pure profit seeking will impose some 
harms on others.53 Some governmental regulation is needed to 
address those externalities.54 But believers in the contractarian 
approach think that regulation will not be needed in many areas, 
and that political processes too frequently tend to lead to 
unnecessary, inefficient legal rules.55 
B. Communitarianism 
Opposing the dominant approach is the loyal opposition, the 
communitarian approach. In its current version in American law 
it was given important articulation in a volume of essays edited 
by Larry Mitchell called Progressive Corporate Law.56 A related 
                                                                                                     
their best to take advantage of their investors, but they find that the dynamics 
of the market drive them to act as if they had investors’ interests at heart. It is 
almost as if there were an invisible hand.”). 
 50. See Gary M. Anderson & Robert D. Tollison, Adam Smith’s Analysis of 
Joint-Stock Companies, 90 J. POL. ECON. 1237, 1254 (1982) (“The basic problem 
with the joint-stock firm in Smith’s analysis was poor adaptability due to agency 
cost problems.”). 
 51. Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase 
Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 1970. 
 52. See id. (warning against government intervention, but admitting, “I do 
not see how one can avoid the use of the political mechanism altogether”). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. See Millon, supra note 30, at 1377–78 (noting that contractarians would 
instead leave decision-making to the parties to corporate contracts). 
 56. See generally MITCHELL, supra note 11 (arguing that corporations can 
no longer be viewed as private institutions, but must instead be viewed as 
having public obligations). 
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influential theory is the team production theory of Margaret Blair 
and Lynn Stout.57 A more recent major statement of elements of 
this approach is Kent Greenfield’s book, The Failure of Corporate 
Law: Fundamental Flaws and Progressive Possibilities.58 
The communitarian approach differs both in its theory of 
persons and of collective action.59 Stated briefly, it tends to 
believe that persons are better and markets are worse than the 
contractarian approach assumes.60 Though self-interest is 
certainly an important motivator for virtually all persons, the 
communitarian approach believes that persons are more sociable, 
and their preferences are more malleable, than is typically 
presumed by contractarians.61 Social norms of faithfulness and 
pursuing the public good can play a major role in guiding 
behavior.62 That is not to say that humans can become 
super-humanly virtuous, but they can become humanly virtuous. 
Social circumstances crucially affect the quality and strength of 
norms. Thus, creating social institutions—including business 
associations—that encourage positive norms becomes an 
important goal of public policy. 
Norms thus become an important focus in addressing agency 
problems within corporations. Incentives tied to self-interest 
matter too, no question, but if persons believe they are working in 
just institutions, they will in many circumstances faithfully 
pursue the best interests of those institutions even where not 
                                                                                                     
 57. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of 
Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 265–69 (1999) (analyzing corporate law 
through the lens of a venture designed to maximize the welfare of the entirety of 
the business team, rather than individual investors). 
 58. See generally KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW: 
FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS AND PROGRESSIVE POSSIBILITIES (2006) (cataloging the past 
failures of corporate law and proposing change). 
 59. See Millon, supra note 30, at 1378 (defining communitarians as those 
who rely more heavily on legal rules to mitigate harmful effects experienced by 
non-shareholders). 
 60. See id. at 1378 n.20 (“[I]t is possible to retain a commitment to the 
moral value of individual autonomy and choice while nevertheless rejecting the 
market as a sufficient solution to all problems.”). 
 61. See id. at 1379 (distinguishing communitarians as focusing on the 
public effects of corporate behavior, rather than on internal corporate 
relationships). 
 62. See Johnson, Counter-Narrative, supra note 1, at 855 (recognizing that 
the norms of officers and directors largely guide their behaviors). 
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doing so could personally enrich the agents.63 Norm-based 
internalization of the good of the institution is more efficient than 
the use of costly incentive mechanisms.64 Law, including fiduciary 
duty law, can play a significant role in shaping strong norms. 
Through a similar argument, communitarians believe that 
corporate officers and directors can and should consider the best 
interests of a variety of corporate stakeholders, not just 
shareholders, in deciding how the corporation should act.65 
Communitarians tend to think that externalities are severe and 
widespread.66 Corporate behavior deeply affects the interests of 
all sorts of persons and groups, and market prices cannot fully 
capture all of those effects by a long shot.67 A significant degree of 
regulation is needed to stop corporations from imposing harms on 
others, but the more that corporations faithfully pursue a broad 
stakeholder vision, the less need there will be for intrusive 
regulations.68 And there will also be less need to exercise 
expensive enforcement of what regulations are still needed, 
because stakeholder corporate managers will be more likely to 
voluntarily comply with legal rules without the threat of being 
caught in violations. Some versions of communitarian theory also 
stress the benefits from involving groups other than 
shareholders, especially employees, involved in making corporate 
decisions, at various levels.69 
Of course, not all writing on corporate law falls neatly into 
one or the other of these two approaches. Not even all writing 
with a strong normative dimension falls into one or the other. 
                                                                                                     
 63. See Millon, supra note 30, at 1382 (asserting that communitarians will 
feel a sense of obligation in the absence of contract, through merely their 
membership in a community). 
 64. See Johnson, Counter-Narrative, supra note 1, at 857.  
 65. See Millon, supra note 30, at 1379 (illustrating this point by noting that 
Time Inc. rejected an offer that would have largely benefitted shareholders 
because it would have had such a negative impact on Time employees). 
 66. Id. at 1382. 
 67. Id. at 1379. 
 68. See Johnson, Counter-Narrative, supra note 1, at 857 (alluding to moral 
standards of corporations as the appropriate method to reduce corporate 
self-interest and promote public service). 
 69. See GREENFIELD, supra note 58, at 163 (suggesting that if employees 
can trust that a business cares about them, they will be more likely to obey 
company rules). 
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There is much disagreement and variation within each approach, 
with some scholars articulating purer and more extreme versions 
of their approaches than others. Some writing contains 
significant elements of each approach, and other writing does not 
fit into either category.70 Still, much contemporary writing on 
corporate law can be usefully classified as following one or the 
other of these two approaches.71 
III. Religious Views of Human Nature and Collective Action 
I now move to a consideration of our three religious thinkers. 
In this Part, I lay out the core ideas of each concerning individual 
personality and sin, the relationship between individuals and the 
community, and on the role of corporations in society. In Part IV, 
I will apply those core ideas to issues of fiduciary duty, corporate 
purpose, and regulation. 
A. Rauschenbusch 
Let us start with the religious thinker who is closest to 
Lyman Johnson’s work, and to the communitarian approach in 
corporate law. Walter Rauschenbusch was the leading figure in 
the Social Gospel movement of the early twentieth century. The 
Social Gospel movement tried to move the focus of Christian 
churches from questions of individual morals and salvation to the 
pressing social issues of the time, including mass 
industrialization and growing inequality.72 Of Rauschenbusch’s 
two leading books, the first, Christianity and the Social Crisis, 
focused on a historical account of Christianity culminating in 
extended analysis of the economic problems of his time.73 The 
                                                                                                     
 70. Compare NOVAK, THEOLOGY, supra note 28 (discussing 
contractarianism), and RAUSCHENBUSCH, SOCIAL CRISIS, supra note 24 (detailing 
communitarianism), with NIEBUHR, supra note 26 (casting doubt on both 
theories). 
 71. See Millon, supra note 30, at 1377 (characterizing the two competing 
ideals as creating a “rift” of disagreement). 
 72. See WALTER RAUSCHENBUSCH, A THEOLOGY FOR THE SOCIAL GOSPEL 1–9 
(1917) [hereinafter RAUSCHENBUSCH, SOCIAL GOSPEL] (introducing the social 
gospel as a novel movement placing more emphasis on service to others). 
 73. See generally RAUSCHENBUSCH, SOCIAL CRISIS, supra note 24. 
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second, A Theology for the Social Gospel, tried to give a more 
philosophically and theologically grounded argument for the 
Social Gospel.74 
For Rauschenbusch, sin is putting one’s selfish gains over 
the good of mankind.75 Profit-seeking does not come out looking 
good.  
We love and serve God when we love and serve our fellows, 
whom he loves and in whom he lives. We rebel against God 
and repudiate his will when we set our profit and ambition 
above the welfare of our fellows and above the Kingdom of 
God which binds them together.76  
If sin is selfishness, and salvation is serving others, then 
the Social Gospel focuses Christianity’s attention on improving 
the state of society.  
As soon as the desire for salvation becomes strong and 
intelligent enough to look beyond the personal sins of the 
individual, and to discern how our personality in its intake 
and output is connected with the social groups to which we 
belong, the problem of social redemption is before us and we 
can never again forget it.77  
And this is not just about each individual saving themselves by 
striving to do good—the justice of social institutions themselves 
is critical. Rauschenbusch explains, “[i]t is not enough to think 
of the Kingdom as a prevalence of good will. The institutions of 
life must be fundamentally fraternal and co-operative if they are 
to train men to love their fellowmen as coworkers.”78 
As we have seen above and will discuss more below, the 
communitarian approach to corporate law focuses on the role of 
social norms in encouraging pro-social behavior.79 
                                                                                                     
 74. See RAUSCHENBUSCH, SOCIAL GOSPEL, supra note 72, at 1 (“The social 
gospel needs a theology to make it effective; but theology needs the social gospel 
to vitalize it.”). 
 75. See id. at 47 (“The definition of sin as selfishness furnishes an excellent 
theological basis for social conception of sin and salvation.”). 
 76. Id. at 48. 
 77. Id. at 24. 
 78. Id. at 54. 
 79. See generally Johnson, Counter-Narrative, supra note 1 (advocating for 
a normative approach to corporate law). 
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Rauschenbusch does as well.80 And he stresses that those norms 
are themselves social constructs.81  
A theology for the social gospel would have to say that original 
sin is partly social. It runs down the generations not only by 
biological propagation but also by social assimilation.  
. . . . 
In the main the individual takes over his moral judgments and 
valuations from his social class, profession, neighbourhood, 
and nation, making only slight personal modifications in the 
group standards.82 
Rauschenbusch’s emphasis on social institutions and seeking 
the good of others leads to a political program that is somewhere 
between the progressivism of his time and full-fledged socialism. 
He frequently focuses on workers and their mistreatment by the 
corporations of his time.83 As we shall discuss in more detail 
below, sometimes he calls for better behavior by managers, but 
other times he calls for labor unions, cooperatives, and state 
ownership to boost the power of labor and limit the power of 
capital.84 Thus, Rauschenbusch suggests a variety of possible 
ways to limit corporate power, but he most certainly does not 
believe a la Friedman that largely unregulated profit-seeking 
corporations will mostly lead to outcomes that benefit mankind 
and society.85 
                                                                                                     
 80. See RAUSCHENBUSCH, SOCIAL GOSPEL, supra note 72, at 57–68 
(discussing sin as a barrier to social advancement). 
 81. See id. (suggesting that instead of dismissing sinful behavior as forces 
of evil, which tends to idealize immoral behavior, society could improve by 
promoting behavior that meets religious norms). 
 82. Id. at 61. 
 83. See RAUSCHENBUSCH, SOCIAL CRISIS, supra note 24, at 406–07 
(discussing the continuing struggle of the working class to gain only nominal 
advancement in comparison to corporate owners). 
 84. See, e.g., id. at 400–11 (calling for a movement of the working class 
while also recognizing a need for cooperation between workers and owners).  
 85. Compare id. at 386–87 (referring to government regulation and 
Christian stewardship as two ways to reassert public rights in corporations), 
with Friedman, supra note 51 (suggesting that a free-enterprise, market 
approach will most effectively promote positive social ends). 
1058 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1043 (2017) 
B. Novak 
For a religious thinker who comes much closer to Friedman’s 
vision, we turn to Michael Novak. Novak is a Catholic 
philosopher, whose major work is The Spirit of Democratic 
Capitalism.86 Also quite relevant for our topic is Toward a 
Theology of the Corporation.87 Novak defends a pluralistic vision 
of capitalism.88 He has a much more benign view than 
Rauschenbusch of the role of corporations in our capitalist 
system.89 
Like Rauschenbusch, Novak recognizes the self-centeredness 
of human beings that is at the core of the Christian concept of 
sin.90 However, he recommends quite different political strategies 
for addressing that self-centeredness. For one, he sees it as an 
argument for pluralism and the value of multiple power centers 
within a society.91 Novak argues that “[t]he perception of each of 
us is regularly more self-centered than our ideal selves can 
plausibly commend. We are not often as objective as we would 
like to be. That is why the separation of systems is appropriate to 
our weakness.”92 He fears socialism because it centralizes power 
in the state.93 
                                                                                                     
 86. See generally NOVAK, SPIRIT, supra note 17 (viewing the ideal of 
democratic capitalism through a religious lens). 
 87. See generally NOVAK, THEOLOGY, supra note 28 (seeking to further a 
debate about religion as a force in world affairs through a discussion of 
Christianity in corporations). 
 88. See NOVAK, SPIRIT, supra note 17, at 49 (acknowledging that pluralism 
distinguishes democratic capitalism from other forms of political economies). 
 89. Compare id. at 92–93 (advancing the theory that market forces may 
adequately control corporate behavior and benefit society), with 
RAUSCHENBUSCH, SOCIAL CRISIS, supra note 24, at 386–87 (calling for 
government regulation with an eye toward social interests). 
 90. See NOVAK, SPIRIT, supra note 17, at 92 (“A system committed to the 
principle that individuals are best placed to judge their real interests for 
themselves may be accused of institutionalizing selfishness and greed . . . .”). 
 91. See id. at 91–92 (identifying family, work, laws, and factions as 
necessities to democratic capitalism). 
 92. Id. at 353. 
 93. Id. at 190–91. 
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Novak also follows Adam Smith in arguing that selfishness 
can be usefully harnessed to benefit the public within a free 
market system.94 
Yet if one keeps uppermost in mind the material needs of the 
poor, the hungry, and the oppressed, rather than one’s own 
state of feelings, one asks: What is the most effective, practical 
way of raising the wealth of nations? What causes wealth? I 
have come to think that the dream of democratic socialism is 
inferior to the dream of democratic capitalism, and that the 
latter’s superiority in actual practice is undeniable.95 Toward 
the desired moral outcome, the exercise of rational 
self-interest on the part of every citizen is, in the real world of 
historical examples, a far more successful means than the 
exercise of other motivations.96  
But Novak does not see humans in capitalist society as 
purely self-centered and self-seeking—far from it.97 In fact, he 
thinks commerce and life within corporations actually generates 
much regard for the interests of others.98 Novak maintains that 
“[s]uccessful management in a large firm depends upon an ability 
to understand people, to inspire, and to draw the best out of 
them.”99 Additionally, he advocates that “[t]he ideals of 
democratic capitalism are not purely individualist, either, for the 
corporation draws upon and requires highly developed social 
skills like mutual trust, teamwork, compromise, cooperation, 
creativity, originality and inventiveness, and agreeable 
management and personnel relations.”100 Indeed, for many 
workers, corporations are a central source of community. Novak 
explains, “For many millions of religious persons the daily milieu 
in which they work out their salvation is the communal, 
corporate world of the workplace. For many, the workplace is a 
                                                                                                     
 94. See id. at 79–80 (suggesting that “[i]n the real world, moral motives do 
not suffice”). 
 95. Id. at 26. 
 96. Id. at 79. 
 97. See id. at 93 (“The real interests of individuals . . . are seldom merely 
self-regarding.”). 
 98. See id. (identifying family, community, and sympathy as other 
motivators). 
 99. Id. at 47. 
 100. NOVAK, THEOLOGY, supra note 28, at 52. 
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kind of second family. Even those who hate their work often like 
their co-workers.”101 
Like Friedman, Novak believes that there is some need for 
state regulation of the economy to prevent corporations from 
imposing harms on others.102 But also like Friedman, he believes 
that the need for regulation is limited.103  
In some areas, no doubt, the political system will wish to have 
its say in economic affairs. Smith gave many examples in 
which he judged such political intervention useful and 
commendable. There can be no doubt, however, about the main 
thrust of Smith’s argument: that markets as free as possible 
from governmental and religious command best serve the 
common good. Such a system frees the intelligence, 
imagination, and enterprise of individuals to explore the 
possibilities inherent in world process . . . .104 
Thus, Novak’s general philosophy of democratic capitalism is 
closely related to, and draws upon, the contractarian approach to 
corporations. 
C. Niebuhr 
Our final religious thinker is Reinhold Niebuhr, with his 
philosophy of Christian realism. Niebuhr’s early book, Moral Man 
and Immoral Society,105 is perhaps his most striking and 
influential foray into social analysis, while The Nature and 
Destiny of Man106 is the most comprehensive statement of his 
theology. 
                                                                                                     
 101. Id. at 41. 
 102. See NOVAK, SPIRIT, supra note 17, at 80 (admitting that self-interest 
alone may not be sufficient). 
 103. See id. at 84 (warning against the politicization of moral and cultural 
issues). 
 104. Id. at 79. 
 105. See generally NIEBUHR, supra note 26 (suggesting that individuals have 
the capacity to act morally, but that entering into social groups reduces the 
ability to refrain from self-interested behavior).  
 106. See generally 1 REINHOLD NIEBUHR, THE NATURE AND DESTINY OF MAN 
(1941) [hereinafter NIEBUHR, NATURE] (purporting to provide a theory of human 
nature from a Christian perspective); 2 REINHOLD NIEBUHR, THE NATURE AND 
DESTINY OF MAN (1943) [hereinafter NIEBUHR, DESTINY] (analyzing Christian 
concepts of redemption and human destiny). 
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Like so many, Niebuhr sees self-centeredness and pride as 
the fundamental source of sin.107 Humans can and do strive to see 
and act beyond themselves, but these efforts are always 
imperfect. Worse, they are typically more imperfect than we know 
them to be. Niebuhr proposes that “[i]t is characteristic of human 
nature, whether in its individual or collective expression, that it 
has no possibility of exercising power, without running the 
danger of overestimating the purity of the wisdom which directs 
it.”108 
One would think that acting together in communal groups 
would then be a critical element in moving beyond self-centered 
sin, as Rauschenbusch believed.109 And there is indeed something 
to that. But for Niebuhr, there is a cruel paradox in collective 
organizations. The very focus of energy that takes the 
participants beyond themselves makes them more suspicious and 
hostile towards those outside the collective.110 “In every human 
group,” he notes, “there is less reason to guide and to check 
impulse, less capacity for self-transcendence, less ability to 
comprehend the needs of others and therefore more unrestrained 
egoism than the individuals, who compose the group, reveal in 
their personal relationships.”111 He asserts, “The moral 
obtuseness of human collectives makes a morality of pure 
disinterestedness impossible. There is not enough imagination in 
any social group to render it amenable to the influence of pure 
love.”112 Hence the title of Niebuhr’s most famous book, with the 
attempts of moral men leading to an immoral society. It is the 
opposite of the dynamic asserted by Smith and Novak, whereby 
individual pursuit of self-interest leads to good social outcomes.113 
                                                                                                     
 107. See NIEBUHR, supra note 26, at 60 (noting that religion condemns 
selfishness). 
 108. REINHOLD NIEBUHR, THE IRONY OF AMERICAN HISTORY 132 (1952). 
 109. See RAUSCHENBUSCH, SOCIAL CRISIS, supra note 24, at 402 (promoting 
cooperation among social classes to move away from self-interest and toward 
social gain). 
 110. See NIEBUHR, supra note 26, at 272 (“The selfishness of human 
communities must be regarded as an inevitability.”). 
 111. Id. at xi. 
 112. Id. at 272. 
 113. See supra Part III.B (comparing the contractarian views of Smith and 
Novak). 
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The contractarian position could be summed up as “immoral man 
and moral society,” but Niebuhr posits the reverse.114 
The immorality of groups flows in significant part from the 
behavior of their leaders. Those leaders naturally tend to see 
their power as justified by their virtues, more than is in fact the 
case (even if it is somewhat true, it is less true than the leaders 
want to believe).115 Niebuhr notes that “[t]he simple religious 
insight which underlies these prophetic judgments is that the 
men who are tempted by their eminence and by the possession of 
undue power become more guilty of pride and of injustice than 
those who lack power and position.”116 
Although Niebuhr is thus far less optimistic than Novak that 
collective corporate action within markets will lead to socially 
optimal outcomes, he is also less optimistic than Rauschenbusch 
about the potential for political intervention, either via regulation 
or socialist ownership.117 When the oppressed organize to improve 
their lot and succeed, the logic of collective action will cause them 
in turn to oppress others, and their leaders to take advantage of 
their positions.118 
A too simple social radicalism does not recognize how quickly 
the poor, the weak, the despised of yesterday, may, on gaining 
a social victory over their detractors, exhibit the same 
arrogance and the same will-to-power which they abhorred in 
their opponents and which they were inclined to regard as a 
congenital sin of their enemies.119 
By now, one may have noticed that Niebuhr’s Christian 
realism could just as well, and maybe better, be labeled Christian 
pessimism. Niebuhr is harder to fit within existing corporate law 
                                                                                                     
 114. See generally NIEBUHR, MORAL MAN, supra note 26, at xi (positing the 
theory that societal competition can create immorality even among moral 
individuals). 
 115. See id. at 272–74 (discussing the effect of individual morality on group 
leaders). 
 116. NIEBUHR, NATURE, supra note 106, at 223. 
 117. See NIEBUHR, DESTINY, supra note 106, at 40 (stating one religious 
criticism of legalism is that “[l]aw cannot restrain evil; for the freedom of man is 
such that he can make the keeping of the law the instrument of evil”). 
 118. See NIEBUHR, NATURE, supra note 106, at 226 (“[M]oral pride among the 
weak will accentuate their arrogance when the fortunes of history transmute 
their weakness into strength.”). 
 119. Id. 
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scholarly orthodoxy than either Rauschenbusch or Novak. He is 
neither communitarian nor contractarian. He is a skeptic about 
all of the leading prescriptions about what corporate, and other 
law, should or should not do to constrain corporate behavior.120  
IV. Implications for Corporate Duty and Purpose 
We have now briefly examined the core philosophies of our 
three religious thinkers, Rauschenbusch, Novak, and Niebuhr. 
Each approaches the relationship between individual 
self-centeredness and collective action in organizations like 
corporations quite differently. Each has a different take on how 
well corporations will typically pursue the collective good, and on 
the wisdom of extensive state intervention to correct corporate 
behavior. We now turn to consider how these differing 
understandings of individuals and collectives can provide 
differing perspectives on corporate duty and corporate purpose. 
A. Corporate Duty 
Most corporate law scholarship—at least since the time of 
Berle and Means121—has focused on the principal-agent problem 
as the core issue that corporate law aims to address.122 And most 
attention has focused on fiduciary duty as a way to discipline 
directors and officers who put their own interests in financial 
gain or leisure over the interests of the corporation.123 Lyman 
Johnson has used a religious perspective to provide a distinctive 
slant on the potential for fiduciary duty to shape behavior.124  
                                                                                                     
 120. See NIEBUHR, MORAL MAN, supra note 26, at 40–41 (discussing the 
limited ability of morality and reason to overcome egoistic behavior). 
 121. See generally ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN 
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932) (discussing the separation of 
ownership and control in the corporate setting). 
 122. See id. at 112–16 (recalling the emergence of managers as agents with 
control in business settings). 
 123. See id. at 196–206 (addressing the legal position of management as 
fiduciaries to the corporation). 
 124. See Johnson, Counter-Narrative, supra note 1, at 857 (comparing 
fiduciary duties to the “Golden Rule” of the New Testament). 
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Most scholarship assumes a law and economics approach to 
duty.125 The possibility of being sued for a duty violation imposes 
a potential cost on enriching oneself at the expense of one’s 
company, and rational agents balance that expected cost against 
the gains of violating their duty, and will be deterred if the 
expected costs of a duty violation are high enough relative to the 
gains.126 Moving beyond the economic paradigm, Johnson 
suggests a major role for morality and norms.127 
Religiously-guided business leaders may adhere to an “ethics of 
stewardship” that prevents them from enriching themselves even 
when doing so would be economically rational assuming personal 
financial gain as the primary goal.128 
Johnson further argues, in an important paper, that 
fiduciary duty court opinions can help shape ethical norms.129 
Building on the work of Edward Rock,130 Johnson says that 
judges write in judgmental language that resembles sermons and 
parables.131 The tie to religious narrative and persuasion 
pervades Johnson’s entire analysis.132  
                                                                                                     
 125. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 8, at 1 (describing the 
contract-based approach to corporate management common in corporate law). 
 126. See id. at 1–4 (discussing the potential for misconduct among managers 
and how duty and incentives through appropriate contracts will discourage this 
conduct). 
 127. See Johnson, supra note 2, at 93 (“Perhaps ‘faith-based’ initiatives in 
the private sector . . . warrant serious consideration as an approach to 
upgrading corporate morality.”). 
 128. See id. at 98 (refuting the contractarian theory that private actors must 
be self-seeking, instead suggesting they may value integrity and a commitment 
to serving others). 
 129. See Johnson, Counter-Narrative, supra note 1, at 851 (“Delaware courts 
expound on the fiduciary duties of directors through ‘fact-intensive, normatively 
saturated’ descriptions of saintly and sinful conduct.”). 
 130. See generally Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware 
Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009 (1997) (differentiating between 
standards and rules by comparing Delaware court opinions to parables or 
sermons). Note the title—Rock too is influenced by religious thought. Claire Hill 
and I have explored similar ideas concerning the role of duty cases in 
influencing norms in Penumbra. See Claire Hill & Brett McDonnell, Executive 
Compensation and the Optimal Penumbra of Delaware Corporation Law, 4 VA. 
L. & BUS. REV. 333, 336 (2009) (discussing “why law on the books and as 
enforced cannot properly deal with structural bias”). 
 131. See Johnson, Counter-Narrative, supra note 1, at 850–51 (warning that 
these parables are weakened if not properly retold). 
 132. See generally id. (analyzing corporate law through the lens of Christian 
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Rauschenbusch provides some support for the ability of 
moral suasion to persuade managers to behave in ethical ways 
that puts the interests of their companies over their own selfish 
interests.133 That support is far from total, given the structural 
reality of capitalist corporations. Rauschenbusch was quite 
critical of the corporate management of his time.134 “Corporate 
management,” Rauschenbusch notes, “eliminates personal 
sympathy and the individual sense of honor to a degree which 
many of us hardly understand. The moral code of the business 
man is largely shaped for him by the moral code of his class.”135 
But Rauschenbusch did think there was hope that a 
movement of moral regeneration could persuade corporate 
managers to act differently.136 They could repent and convert. He 
argues that “[t]he fundamental step of repentance and conversion 
for professions and organizations is to give up monopoly power 
and the incomes derived from legalized extortion, and to come 
under the law of service, content with a fair income for honest 
work.”137 This can of course happen individually, manager by 
manager, but Rauschenbusch hoped for a broader movement. 
In the last resort the only hope is in the moral forces which 
can be summoned to the rescue. If there are statesmen, 
prophets, and apostles who set truth and justice above selfish 
advancement; if their call finds a response in the great body of 
the people; if a new tide of religious faith and moral 
enthusiasm creates new standards of duty and a new capacity 
for self-sacrifice; if the strong learn to direct their love of 
power to the uplifting of the people and see the highest 
self-assertion in self-sacrifice—then the intrenchments of 
vested wrong will melt away; the stifled energy of the people 
will leap forward . . . .138 
                                                                                                     
norms and comparing judicial opinions to “sermons”). 
 133. See RAUSCHENBUSCH, SOCIAL CRISIS, supra note 24, at 313 (observing 
that enlightened businessmen see self-serving policies as immoral and 
shameful). 
 134. See id. (arguing against the notion that “unfettered operation of 
self-love” benefits all). 
 135. Id. at 360. 
 136. See RAUSCHENBUSCH, SOCIAL GOSPEL, supra note 72, at 117 (suggesting 
that salvation was possibly by “coming under the law of Christ”). 
 137. Id.  
 138. RAUSCHENBUSCH, SOCIAL CRISIS, supra note 24, at 285. 
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But Rauschenbusch was far from convinced that such a 
moral regenerative movement was likely within the structural 
confines of the capitalist corporation.139 Greed is a powerful force, 
and the shareholder-owned corporation puts the focus on the 
interests of the capitalist class that provides money. Corporate 
managers in this structure are likely to reflect the interests and 
mentality of that class.140 Rauschenbusch thus focused much of 
his attention on alternatives outside the shareholder-owned 
corporation, including worker cooperatives and state ownership.  
If a man wants to lead and direct, he can not do it by money 
power; he must do it by character, sobriety and good 
judgment . . . . Consequently the co-operatives develop men 
and educate a community in helpful loyalty and comradeship. 
This is the advent of true democracy in economic life.141  
Thus, Rauschenbusch straddles the communitarian and the 
regulatory wings of progressive thought. 
Novak has a more optimistic view of managers in the 
corporations of his time.142 He does think that a significant 
amount of egoistic self-interest exists, and follows the 
contractarians in arguing that corporations, and the capitalist 
economy generally, work well in good part because they 
effectively harness that selfishness.143  
Any social order that intends to endure must be based on a 
certain realism about human beings and, therefore, on a 
theory of sin and a praxis for dealing with it. However sin is 
defined, its energies must be given shape, since sinful energies 
overlooked in theory are certain to find outlets in practice. 
Thus some hypothesize that democratic capitalism is based on 
self-interest, greed, acquisitiveness, [and] egotism.144  
                                                                                                     
 139. See RAUSCHENBUSCH, SOCIAL GOSPEL, supra note 72, at 111 (claiming 
that capitalism tends to promote private profit and materialism over public 
service). 
 140. See RAUSCHENBUSCH, SOCIAL CRISIS, supra note 24, at 406–07 
(discussing the two-class system of modern capitalism). 
 141. RAUSCHENBUSCH, SOCIAL GOSPEL, supra note 72, at 112. 
 142. See NOVAK, SPIRIT, supra note 17, at 132–33 (highlighting cooperation 
among corporate managers). Novak’s time is decades later than that of 
Rauschenbusch. This may help explain some of the differences between them.  
 143. See id. at 113–15 (adopting Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” theory to 
describe the order behind choices motivated by self-interest). 
 144. NOVAK, THEOLOGY, supra note 28, at 28. 
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Novak frequently cites Adam Smith on this insight. 
But Novak also thinks that self-ordering within capitalist 
corporations will in many important ways develop an ethic of 
cooperation.145 On this point, his argument fits within but notably 
expands upon the analysis of corporate law contractarians.146 He 
frequently stresses how commerce, especially within corporations, 
is fundamentally cooperative, and persons involved in commerce 
will naturally develop norms of cooperation.147  
The ethic of commerce furnishes a school of virtue favorable to 
democratic governance. This ethic is not pretentious in its 
conception of reason and human nature. It enhances the 
cooperative spirit, since economic tasks cannot be 
accomplished by one person alone. It increases attention to 
law. It singles out the self-determination of the individual as 
the main source of social energy. It places limits on the state 
and other authorities. It incites imagination and industry. It 
disciplines all to common sense.148  
This cooperative spirit shines through particularly when 
working in businesses.  
Operating from rational self-interest, defined as each 
participant chooses through faith, reason and virtue to define 
it, many participants seek satisfactions from their work that 
are far from monetary, selfish, or materialistic. The social 
order is much enhanced by such choices. Philanthropy, the 
arts, education, research, and many other altruistic activities 
are expected to flower and do in fact flower under democratic 
capitalism.149  
“For many millions of religious persons,” Novak explains, “the 
daily milieu in which they work out their salvation is the 
                                                                                                     
 145. See NOVAK, SPIRIT, supra note 17, at 133 (likening corporations to 
communities with similar social cohesion). 
 146. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Community and Statism: A Conservative 
Contractarian Critique of Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship, 82 CORNELL 
L. REV. 856, 871–73 (1997) (book review) (citing Novak as agreeing that the pure 
selfishness posited by much economic argument is an abstraction, and that real 
people are more complex). 
 147. See NOVAK, SPIRIT, supra note 17, at 116–22 (arguing that commerce 
ultimately unites societies, as profit is often contingent upon mutual 
satisfaction). 
 148. Id. at 117–18. 
 149. NOVAK, THEOLOGY, supra note 28, at 11. 
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communal, corporate world of the workplace. For many, the 
workplace is a kind of second family. Even those who hate their 
work often like their co-workers.”150  
This spirit of cooperation, according to Novak, does not 
appear simply among lower level workers.151 It is critical for most 
successful corporate managers too.152 After all, managers must 
manage people. To do so, they must understand those people and 
find ways to get them to work together effectively for the 
interests of the cooperation. That involves both carrots and sticks, 
but carrots often work better. For example, “suppose that some 
autocrats still function in various spheres of authority today, 
including business. What sanctions are available to autocrats 
within a corporation? Leadership in all spheres today seems to 
depend upon large areas of consensus; leaders seem to ‘manage’ 
more than they ‘command.’”153  
It is a much more optimistic vision of corporations, and of the 
role of managers within corporations, than we see in 
Rauschenbusch.154 There may be some role for state regulation to 
deter managerial abuse; however, Novak believes that both 
instrumental and moral mechanisms that corporations develop 
within themselves will for the most part work well to encourage 
managers to focus on the needs of their shareholders and 
employees.155 
Niebuhr provides more pessimistic insights. He is less 
inclined to think that either moral suasion by the courts or 
preachers or internally-generated norms of cooperation that flow 
from working with others are likely to tame the rapacious 
interests of corporate managers.156 He does not deny some role for 
                                                                                                     
 150. Id. at 41. 
 151. See NOVAK, SPIRIT, supra note 17, at 132 (pointing to some amount of 
association at each level of a corporation’s structure). 
 152. See id. at 132–33 (remarking on the cooperative spirit of corporate 
managers). 
 153. NOVAK, THEOLOGY, supra note 28, at 43.  
 154. Compare NOVAK, SPIRIT, supra note 17, at 79 (agreeing with Adam 
Smith’s “invisible hand” theory), with RAUSCHENBUSCH, SOCIAL CRISIS, supra 
note 24, at 370–71 (refuting the idea that success depends on commercialism 
rather than a focus on societal values). 
 155. See NOVAK, SPIRIT, supra note 17, at 79 (“[M]arkets as free as possible 
from governmental and religious command best serve the common good.”). 
 156. See NIEBUHR, supra note 26, at 234 (“[H]uman society will probably 
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self-restraint, but he thinks that role is inevitably limited.157 
Niebuhr explains that “it will always be necessary to rely partly 
upon the honesty and self-restraint of those who are not socially 
restrained. But here again, it will never be possible to insure 
moral antidotes sufficiently potent to destroy the deleterious 
effects of the poison of power upon character.”158 
That reference to the “poison of power” flows from a central 
insight of Niebuhr’s philosophy. The sin of self-centeredness and 
pride lies deep in human character.159 Even where we try to 
break free of it by acting with and for others, the pull of pride is 
deep.160 We give ourselves too much credit for acting morally and 
selflessly than we really deserve.161 And that is even truer for the 
powerful.162 They have done well in the world, and are inclined to 
think their success flows from their natural merit.163 They are 
surrounded by peers who share that belief and by subordinates 
who toady and dare not express doubts about the innate virtue of 
men with the power to fire them.164 “Capitalists,” according to 
Niebuhr, “are not greater sinners than poor labourers by any 
natural depravity. But it is a fact that those who hold great 
economic and political power are more guilty of pride against God 
                                                                                                     
never escape social conflict, even though it extends the areas of social 
co-operation.”). 
 157. See id. at 21 (advocating for a combination of social strategies in order 
to advance society). 
 158. Id.  
 159. See id. at 60 (discussing the difficulty of judging self-interest, as it 
hides behind hidden motives and may not be externally observable). 
 160. See id. at 47 (suggesting that even a man acting in the best interest of 
family may be self-aggrandizing by projecting his own success as a husband and 
father). 
 161. See id. at 45 (arguing that “there is no miracle by which men can 
achieve a rationality high enough” to eliminate self-interest). 
 162. See id. at 8 (noting that while men with power and wealth attempt to 
justify social inequality, “it is impossible to justify the degree of inequality 
which complex societies inevitably create”). 
 163. See id. (“If superior abilities and services to society deserve special 
rewards it may be regarded as axiomatic that the rewards are always higher 
than the services warrant.”). 
 164. See NIEBUHR, NATURE, supra note 106, at 225 (“[S]ocio-economic 
conditions actually determine to a large degree that some men are tempted to 
pride and injustice, while others are encouraged to humility.”). 
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and of injustice against the weak than those who lack power and 
prestige.”165  
One place where one sees this misplaced confidence in one’s 
own merit and virtue is in executive compensation.166 Boards set 
the compensation of top managers, but boards consist of other top 
managers.167 Of course their high pay reflects the great 
contributions they make to the success of the business.168 Niebuhr 
is skeptical. Some incentive pay is needed to motivate managers, 
but almost certainly less than we actually observe.169 The rich 
and powerful must justify their pay to themselves and others, 
and they get creative.170 Niebuhr explains that “since inequalities 
of privilege are greater than could possibly be defended 
rationally, the intelligence of privileged groups is usually applied 
to the task of inventing specious proofs for the theory that 
universal values spring from, and that general interests are 
served by, the special privileges which they hold.”171  
Niebuhr’s insights on the propensity of the powerful to see 
their powers and privileges as naturally ordained and justified is 
closely related to a point about corporate governance that Claire 
Hill and I have called a “pernicious golden rule.”172 Outside 
directors closely identify with the interests of the officers they are 
supposed to monitor, and they make decisions for those they 
monitor that they would hope those who are in turn monitoring 
them would make in their own corporations.173  
                                                                                                     
 165. Id.  
 166. See Hill & McDonnell, supra note 130, at 335 (“[D]irectors may simply 
see the world from the same vantage point as the officers do, a vantage point 
from which the executive compensation packages we have seen are reasonable 
and appropriate.”). 
 167. See id. at 366–67 (noting that executives largely set compensation, and 
boards made of like-minded executives likely will not change this trend). 
 168. See id. at 367 (pointing to an “efficiency-based justification”). 
 169. See id. at 369 (discussing the difficulty of measuring appropriate 
compensation). 
 170. See NIEBUHR, supra note 26, at 8 (“Most rational and social 
justifications of unequal privilege are clearly afterthoughts.”). 
 171. Id. at 117. 
 172. Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Disney, Good Faith, and 
Structural Bias, 32 J. CORP. L. 833, 838 (2007).  
 173. See id. (“The outside directors may thus make decisions that favor 
those officers and themselves even if doing so is not the best course for the 
corporation as a whole.”). 
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Thus, for Niebuhr, power and hierarchy poison relations 
much more than the cooperative vision we see in Novak, and the 
chances of moral suasion removing that poison are less than 
possibly Rauschenbusch, and certainly Johnson, suggest.174 Does 
that mean more intrusive state regulation is needed? Possibly, 
but as we have already noted and will discuss in more detail 
later, Niebuhr is also skeptical about that. 
B. Corporate Purpose 
An ongoing debate in corporate law, dating back at least to 
the Berle-Dodd dialogue of the early thirties, concerns the proper 
purpose that corporations are expected to pursue.175 The previous 
subpart concerned how to ensure that officers and directors 
pursue the corporation’s interests rather than their own, but 
what are the corporation’s interests? Contractarians believe the 
proper purpose is to maximize shareholder value, while 
communitarians think the proper purpose balances the interests 
of various stakeholders, including employees, creditors, the local 
community, and the environment in addition to stakeholders.176 
Lyman Johnson has argued for the 
communitarian/stakeholder position in a series of papers.177 His 
                                                                                                     
 174. Compare NIEBUHR, MORAL MAN, supra note 23, at 21 (discussing the 
“poison of power” and the difficulty of abolishing injustice), with NOVAK, SPIRIT, 
supra note 17, at 129–34 (arguing that the social hierarchy within corporations 
leads to greater cooperation), and RAUSCHENBUSCH, SOCIAL CRISIS, supra note 
24, at 110–17 (suggesting that corporations may find redemption by converting 
to Christian values). 
 175. See generally Adolf A. Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 
HARV. L. REV. 1049 (1931); E. Merrick Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Managers 
Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932). 
 176. See id.  
 177. See, e.g., Lyman Johnson, Relating Fiduciary Duties to Corporate 
Personhood and Corporate Purpose, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON FIDUCIARY LAW 
(Andrew Gold & Gordon Smith, eds.) (forthcoming 2017); Lyman Johnson, Law 
and the History of Corporate Responsibilities: Corporate Governance, 10 U. ST. 
THOMAS L.J. 974, 975 (2013) (focusing on the emergence of the benefit 
corporation); Johnson, Unsettledness, supra note 1, at 405 (recommending a 
pluralistic approach to corporate purpose, accounting for both public and 
shareholder benefit); Lyman Johnson, Reclaiming an Ethic of Corporate 
Responsibility, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 957, 975 (2002) (discussing how to 
“reconcile the interests of the individual with those of the group”). 
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religious perspective plays an important role in grounding his 
arguments for that position.178 Communitarians want 
corporations to pursue the public good and, in many cases, 
religious faith inspires corporate leaders to do just that.179  
What do the thoughts of our three religious thinkers have to 
say about corporate purpose? Rauschenbusch certainly endorses 
the communitarian vision of corporate purpose.180 He is highly 
critical of the corporations of his time on this point. He asserts, 
“Our industrial establishments are institutions for the creation of 
dividends, and not for the fostering of human life. In all our 
public life the question of profit is put first.”181 He believes this 
focus on profit goes against the proper purpose of corporations.182 
According to Rauschenbusch, “[o]ur public-service corporations 
exist for the public, but we know how these our servants have 
become our masters, so that the public exists for their 
dividends.”183 Note the phrase “public-service corporations.”184 
Rauschenbusch frequently uses it, and it embodies his vision of 
proper corporate purpose.185  
Expanding on this point a bit further, he says:  
Our public service corporations exist because the community 
grants them the use of public property and exercises the 
sovereign right of eminent domain on their behalf. They are 
stewards of public property and powers. But we have all seen 
in recent years that they have been very close to forgetting 
that they are stewards and have acted as if they were the 
owners.186  
                                                                                                     
 178. See Johnson, Counter-Narrative, supra note 1, at 853 (drawing parallels 
between corporate law and the biblical narrative). 
 179. See Johnson, supra note 2, at 102 (“[F]or many business people such 
other-regarding behavior flows from religious faith.”). 
 180. See RAUSCHENBUSCH, SOCIAL CRISIS, supra note 24, at 370 (disagreeing 
with the contention that profit-seeking should come before health and 
happiness). 
 181. Id. at 370. 
 182. See id. (arguing that instead of asking how people may boost corporate 
profits, people should ask how corporations may improve society). 
 183. Id. at 186. 
 184. Id.  
 185. See id. at 385 (providing an explanation of why these are 
“public-service” corporations). 
 186. Id. 
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The notion of stewardship is critical for Rauschenbusch. 
Corporations may be private entities, but they are enabled by the 
state in order to further a public purpose, and corporate leaders 
should always remember that and make the public good the 
objective that they are always pursuing.187 
As we have seen, though, Rauschenbusch is far from 
convinced that simply positing this corporate purpose and linking 
the duty of corporate directors and officers to it will be enough to 
guarantee that those managers do indeed generally pursue the 
public good.188 Sometimes he does call for a moral regeneration 
which will inspire managers to pursue the public good.189 But 
sometimes he calls for more structural changes that will cause 
corporations to focus on their proper purpose.190 As noted above, 
he called for worker cooperatives and state ownership as other 
solutions to the problem of an excessive focus on profit.191 
Novak, by contrast, appears to think that the fiduciary duty 
of corporate directors and officers does run to shareholders.192 
And he seems to agree with Friedman and Smith that this will, 
through the magic of the market, tend to lead to socially 
beneficial results.193 However, Novak also stresses another point 
frequently made by contractarians, namely, that the long-run 
profitability of a corporation is typically enhanced by responding 
                                                                                                     
 187. See id. (noting that rate regulations are a way for the public to remind 
corporations that the public retains control).  
 188. See id. at 382 (recognizing that as society becomes more complex, 
corporate “trustees” may be more tempted to succumb to self-interest). 
 189. See id. at 220 (calling for social regeneration “if our Christian 
civilization is to stand and advance”). 
 190. See id. at 401 (analogizing the working class to army that must become 
organized to fight for its cause). 
 191. See supra Part III.A (describing Rauschenbusch’s calls for 
reorganization). 
 192. See NOVAK, SPIRIT, supra note 17, at 93 (arguing that firms owe 
fiduciary duties to shareholders). For an extended analysis of why that might 
indeed be socially beneficial, written by a Catholic corporate law scholar who 
shares much of Novak’s vision of the spirit of democratic capitalism, see 
Bainbridge, supra note 146, at 858 (proposing “a conservative variant on the 
basic contractarian model”). 
 193. See NOVAK, SPIRIT, supra note 17, at 93 (suggesting that market forces 
will tend to weed out greedy corporate actors while rewarding those with 
integrity). 
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to the needs and concerns of other corporate stakeholders.194 
Thus, in practice the shareholder and stakeholder visions are 
really not that different in what they imply for actual behavior.195 
Novak says: 
Apart from internal restraints, the system itself places 
restraints upon greed and narrowly construed self-interest. 
Greed and selfishness, when they occur, are made to have 
their costs. A firm aware of its long-term fiduciary 
responsibilities to its shareholders must protect its 
investments for future generations. It must change with the 
times. It must maintain a reputation for reliability, integrity, 
and fairness.196  
Elaborating further on this point, Novak argues:  
[T]here is a difference between maximization of profit and 
optimization of profit. To aim at maximizing profit—that is, to 
obtain the greatest profit possible out of every opportunity—is 
to be greedy in the present at the expense of the future. The 
profit maximizer demands too much for products that can be 
produced more cheaply by somebody else and in the process 
narrows his market and destroys his reputation. Inevitably, he 
damages himself and, in time, destroys himself . . . . By 
contrast, to optimize profit is to take many other factors 
besides profit into account, including long-term new 
investment, consumer loyalty, and the sense of a fair service 
for a fair price.197  
Thus, Novak again thinks that the social nature of the 
corporation will tend to smooth out conflicts and problems.198 
Corporate managers must work with and anticipate the needs of 
                                                                                                     
 194. See id. (noting that greedy behavior will affect not only shareholders, 
but customers, employees, competitors, and the public). I discuss the literature 
on long-versus short-run profit and its relationship to the proper purpose of 
corporations in Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Short and Long-Term 
Investors (and Other Stakeholders Too): Must (and Do) Their Interests Conflict?, 
in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 396 (Claire A. Hill & 
Steven Davidoff Solomon eds., 2016). 
 195. See NOVAK, SPIRIT, supra note 17, at 93 (observing that limiting self-
interested behavior would improve corporations and personal life). 
 196. Id. at 1554. 
 197. NOVAK, THEOLOGY, supra note 28, at 45–46. 
 198. See id. at 50 (“While corporations spring from some of our most 
cherished ideals about liberty, initiative, investment in the future, cooperation, 
and the like, they must also be judged in light of our ideals.”).  
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many different groups, and good managers will work to pursue 
the interests of those different groups as a way of advancing the 
interests of their businesses and themselves. In contrast, Novak 
thinks that the democratic promise of cooperatives, cited 
approvingly by Rauschenbusch, looks beguiling but in fact is not 
a good idea:  
To organize industry democratically would be a grave and 
costly error, since democratic procedures are not designed for 
productivity and efficiency. Poor management may not 
recognize that workmen on the line are fertile in figuring out 
new and better ways of doing things; but good management 
does. The more a corporation embodies the principle of 
subsidiarity in its organization, the closer to its work force it 
becomes.199  
Again, Steve Bainbridge provides a more extended economic 
defense of this claim.200 
Niebuhr once again throws some cold water on both 
positions. He is skeptical about how broadly corporate leaders can 
cast their sympathies.201 Can they really, honestly commit 
themselves to a broad pursuit of the public good? They may think 
they can and do, but as usual Niebuhr suspects that most will 
have an underlying partial and self-centered picture of the world 
that is less noble than they believe themselves to be.202 They 
flatter themselves, as do those around them, but when push 
comes to shove, they care most about the bottom line of their own 
well-being.  
The man of power, though humane impulse may awaken in 
him, always remains something of the beast of prey . . . . His 
philanthropy is a perfect illustration of the curious compound 
of the brutal and the moral which we find in all human 
behavior; for his generosity is at once a display of his power 
and an expression of his pity. His generous impulses freeze 
                                                                                                     
 199. NOVAK, SPIRIT, supra note 17, at 178–79. 
 200. See Bainbridge, supra note 146, at 878 (“The theory seems to hold that 
having a say in corporate decisionmaking leads workers to view their efforts as 
part of a collaborative undertaking, rather than as just a job.”). 
 201. See NIEBUHR, MORAL MAN, supra note 23, at 14–15 (arguing that with 
the “increased centralization of economic power” economic power “has become 
the significant coercive force of modern society”).  
 202. See id. (“The moral attitudes of dominant and privileged groups are 
characterized by universal self-deception and hypocrisy.”). 
1076 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1043 (2017) 
within him if his power is challenged or his generosities are 
accepted without grateful humility.203  
So much for the hope of an ethic of stewardship. 
It is more plausible to believe that corporate directors and 
officers can indeed become firmly devoted to the interests of 
shareholders. Modern compensation ties their own pecuniary 
self-interest firmly to share price. Moreover, a focus on just 
shareholders involves less complexity and imaginative projection, 
and most shareholders belong to the same class as managers, 
with shared identities and values. So perhaps then the link 
between long term shareholder value and helping other 
stakeholders, emphasized by Novak and others, will cause 
managers to behave in a way that advances the public good, at 
least much of the time.  
But there too Niebuhr has an argument that casts serious 
doubt. Imagine a corporate manager genuinely committed to 
shareholder value maximization, facing a decision between 
making a healthy profit now versus foregoing that profit now to 
do something that has a good chance of bringing much more 
profit in the future, but where the link to the future is quite 
uncertain. Perhaps if the manager were the sole shareholder, 
acting on her own behalf, she would believe the risk is worth it. 
But will she think that if she is acting on behalf of a large 
number of shareholders? Niebuhr suggests no. He argues that 
“[a]n individual may sacrifice his own interests, either without 
hope of reward or in the hope of an ultimate compensation. But 
how is an individual, who is responsible for the interests of his 
group, to justify the sacrifice of interests other than his own?”204  
This suggests that an ethic of shareholder value 
maximization may cause managers to do things that do not in 
fact really best promote shareholder interests in the long run, 
because the long run effects are hard to quantify, squishy, and 
uncertain.205 A genuine sense of responsibility makes them loath 
to take that risk, even where they would do so acting for 
themselves, and even where the shareholders themselves, if 
                                                                                                     
 203. Id. at 13–14. 
 204. Id. at 267. 
 205. See id. (“But how is an individual, who is responsible for the interests of 
his group, to justify the sacrifice of interests other than his own?”). 
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surveyed, might think the risk is worth taking.206 I suspect that a 
dynamic like this is an important element in understanding the 
effects of the growing dominance of the shareholder value norm 
in recent decades. 
As with Niebuhr on duty, so too here with Niebuhr on 
purpose; perhaps the conclusion is that promoting more pro-social 
behavior by corporate managers is not the solution, and that 
greater state regulation is needed. If we cannot trust corporations 
to pursue the social good on their own where that good goes 
against the dictates of profit (and sometimes even when the 
public good and the dictates of profit are consistent, but only in 
an overly indeterminate future), then maybe we need to legally 
require corporations to act better through various specific laws 
addressing specific sources of social harm that businesses cause. 
We turn to that question next, and we shall see that Niebuhr is 
also skeptical about this answer. 
V. Regulation and Pluralism 
The previous Part focused on the implications of the thought 
of our three religious thinkers for internal regulation by and of 
corporations—essentially, how to think about motivating the 
behavior of corporate directors and officers. We now turn to the 
implications of their thought for questions of external regulation 
and pluralism. How much need there is for external regulation 
depends in part upon how well you think corporations will be 
internally motivated to care about the effects they have upon 
various internal and external stakeholders, which we have just 
explored. It also depends upon how severe you think the potential 
effects of corporate harms are, and upon how well you think state 
actors will be able to formulate and enforce effective rules. 
A. The Promise and Peril of Regulation 
As we have seen, Rauschenbusch is ambivalent about the 
ability of capitalist corporations, and those who run them, to 
reform themselves and serve the public interest as they are 
                                                                                                     
 206. Id.  
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meant to.207 He holds out some hope of a moral movement that 
transforms the vision of corporate leaders.208 But he was skeptical 
about the prospects.209 Managers and shareholders made huge 
profits under the existing system; getting them to forego a 
significant chunk of those profits is hard to do. 
Rauschenbusch hoped to persuade corporate managers to 
change, but contemplated other strategies if they refused:  
The present movement for federal and state interference and 
control over corporations . . . is an effort reassert the 
ownership and mastership of the people and to force these 
stewards of public powers back into the position of public 
servants. The next decade will probably show whether they 
are willing to take the position of well-paid servants and cease 
from ousting the owner. If not, the people will have to say, 
“Render the account of thy stewardship, for thou canst no 
longer be steward.”210  
Rauschenbusch advocated a variety of alternative strategies. 
We have already seen that he championed worker cooperatives 
and labor unions.211 He also advocated direct socialism, including 
state ownership of at least some leading corporations, and 
regulation of others.212 He thought that democratic politics 
inspired by spiritual ideals had great promise. According to 
Rauschenbusch, “[i]f men conceive of political duties as a high 
religious service to man and God, the State can be a powerful 
                                                                                                     
 207. See generally RAUSCHENBUSCH, SOCIAL CRISIS, supra note 24; see also 
RAUSCHENBUSCH, SOCIAL GOSPEL, supra note 72, at 113 (“Whenever capitalism 
has invaded a new country or industry, there has been a speeding up in labor 
and in the production of wealth, but always with a trail of human misery, 
discontent, bitterness, and demoralization.”). 
 208. See RAUSCHENBUSCH, SOCIAL CRISIS, supra note 24, at 386 (arguing that 
state and federal interference with corporations may force corporate leaders to 
become more conscientious and serve the public); see also id. at 285 (hoping for a 
broader movement of “religious faith” and “moral enthusiasm”).  
 209. See RAUSCHENBUSCH, SOCIAL GOSPEL, supra note 72, at 111 (claiming 
that the structure of capitalism limits the desire for individuals to engage in 
public service). 
 210. RAUSCHENBUSCH, SOCIAL CRISIS, supra note 24, at 386. 
 211. Id. at 400–11 (advocating for the benefits of a working class movement, 
as well as a movement to promote cooperation between workers and owners). 
 212. Id. at 406–07 (advocating for a workers’ movement and lamenting the 
continuing struggle of the working class to gain advancement). 
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agent in the bettering of human life.”213 Additionally, he argues 
that “[t]he social body needs moral innervation; and the spread of 
men who combine religious faith, moral enthusiasm, and 
economic information, and apply the combined result to public 
morality, promises to create a moral sensitiveness never yet 
known.”214 Rauschenbusch is of course aware of the difficulty of 
overcoming the political power of the dominant capitalist class.215 
However, he has faith that a democratic movement can 
succeed.216  
And he asks no questions about possible abuses if such a 
movement did succeed. In part this reflects the time period in 
which Rauschenbusch wrote. Christianity and the Social Crisis217 
appeared before World War I, and A Theology for the Social 
Gospel218 appeared as that war ended. Thus, the world had not 
yet experienced communism in power in the Soviet Union and 
elsewhere, nor had the United States yet experienced the full 
welfare and regulatory state that would be put in place under the 
New Deal.219 Our other two writers had that additional 
experience, and it affected their thinking about politics 
significantly. 
As we have seen, Novak is much more sanguine about 
corporations than Rauschenbusch. He believes that both the 
market system and the internal logic of cooperation will cause 
corporations to mostly pursue the public good quite effectively.220 
                                                                                                     
 213. Id. at 183. 
 214. Id. at 357. 
 215. See id. at 186 (“In so far as [the Church] is loyalty to [things as they 
ought to be], it must be in perpetual but friendly conflict with the State . . . .”). 
 216. See id. at 286 (“It will depend almost wholly on the moral forces which 
the Christian nations can bring to the fighting line against wrong, and the 
fighting energy of those moral forces will again depend on the degree to which 
they are inspired by religious faith and enthusiasm.”). 
 217. Id. 
 218. RAUSCHENBUSCH, SOCIAL GOSPEL, supra note 72. 
 219. See John Braithwaite, The Regulatory State?, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
POL. INSTS. 219–20 (2011) (describing the rise of the regulatory state). 
 220. See NOVAK, SPIRIT, supra note 17, at 93 (noting that individuals are 
often influenced by community, family, and sympathy in addition to their own 
self interest, and arguing that corporate management will act in accordance 
with those values to draw the best out of their employees).  
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There will still be some need to regulate to protect the public, but 
the need is quite limited.221  
In some areas, no doubt, the political system will wish to have 
its say in economic affairs. Smith gave many examples in 
which he judged such political intervention useful and 
commendable. There can be no doubt, however, about the main 
thrust of Smith’s argument: that markets as free as possible 
from governmental and religious command best serve the 
common good. Such a system frees the intelligence, 
imagination, and enterprise of individuals to explore the 
possibilities inherent in world process . . . .222  
Beyond thinking that state intervention is mostly not 
needed, Novak also thinks that state power is quite dangerous, 
and needs to be limited.223 His key works were written in the 
seventies and eighties.224 The Soviet Union still loomed large, and 
the deregulation of the Reagan years was just beginning. Novak 
worried greatly about tyranny if state power was unchecked.225 In 
describing the spirit of democratic capitalism, Novak conceived of 
it as a system with three major components: political, economic, 
and cultural.226 Each exercises a great deal of power, and each 
helps check the other two.227 This pluralistic system prevents any 
one of the three components from becoming too powerful.  
This differentiation of systems sets individuals possessed of 
the will-to-power on three separate tracks. Political activists 
may compete for eminence in the political system, economic 
activists in the economic system, religious activists and 
intellectual in various parts of the moral-cultural system. But 
the powers of each of the three systems over the others, while 
in each case substantial, are firmly limited. It is not likely that 
                                                                                                     
 221. See id. at 80 (determining that self interest alone may not be sufficient 
to prevent corporations from imposing harm on others). 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. at 231–32. 
 224. For example, Novak’s Democratic Capitalism, id., was written in 1982.  
 225. See id. at 79 (illustrating that a market system free from governmental 
commands liberates intelligence and imagination, allowing individuals to 
explore possibilities of interest).  
 226. See id. at 172–86 (discussing the presence of three different systems—
economic, political, and cultural—as the driving forces behind democratic 
capitalism). 
 227. See id. at 185 (illustrating the tension between the cultural system and 
the political and economic systems).  
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one person or party can gain complete dominance over all 
three systems, and should such misfortune come to pass, there 
remain plural roads by which offended forces may attack each 
pretender at his weakest points.228 
Thus, socialist ownership of large businesses or extensive 
regulation by powerful administrative agencies risks both 
squashing the innovative energy of private enterprise while 
giving too much power to politicians and bureaucrats. 
We have seen that Niebuhr is more skeptical than Novak, or 
even Rauschenbusch, that shareholder-owned corporations 
generally pursue the public interest, or that their leaders can be 
persuaded to do so by a moral reform movement.229 Does he then 
turn to either socialist ownership or extensive state regulation as 
a way to stop corporations from harming the public? He was a 
political liberal during the New Deal and post-World War II era, 
so he did advocate more state intervention than Novak prefers.230 
However, Niebuhr shared Novak’s concerns about the threat of 
concentrated political power.231 He found socialists like 
Rauschenbusch naïve about what would happen after the state 
took over business enterprises. 
They seem to believe that it will be easy to create perfect social 
mutuality by destroying inequality of power. But can they 
destroy economic power without creating strong centres of 
political power? And how may they be certain that this 
political power will be either ethically or politically restrained? 
We have seen that it is difficult to prevent the centralization of 
economic power without giving the political state tremendous 
authority. A powerful state necessitates dangerous 
concentrations of political power in the hands of a few 
individuals and a small group. There is no certainty that this 
                                                                                                     
 228. Id. at 56. 
 229. See supra note 106 and accompanying text (describing Niebur’s theory 
on the morality of man and his capability to act for the benefit of the public 
interest).  
 230. Compare NIEBUHR, MORAL MAN, supra note 26 (advocating for more 
state state intervention), with NOVAK, SPIRIT, supra note 17 (advocating for 
restraint on the part of the State).  
 231. See NIEBUHR, MORAL MAN, supra note 26, at 192 (arguing that 
concentrated political power may be overbearing on the populace). See generally 
NOVAK, SPIRIT, supra note 17. 
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new power can be brought under either perfect ethical or social 
restraint.232 
Niebuhr’s deep distrust of both economic and political power 
flows from his core vision of the immense difficulty of rising above 
our inherent self-centered nature.233 When we do try to do so in 
collective organizations, those organizations themselves become 
overly focused on their group interests, and their leaders are 
filled with pride. That is as true for socialist politicians as it is for 
capitalist managers. 
That leaves Niebuhr with a tough balancing act, and more 
pessimism about the likely outcomes of collective action through 
either economic or political organizations. He does, like 
Rauschenbusch, support cooperatives and labor unions as a form 
of power to counterbalance corporations without posing as much 
of a threat as a large state power.234 Of course, the union and 
cooperative movements looked more promising in the 
mid-twentieth century than they do today. But perhaps this 
provides some insight in thinking about the new social enterprise 
movement. To date, legal reforms like the low-profit LLC and the 
benefit corporation have focused mainly on purpose and duty as 
ways to help encourage enterprises to pursue the public good 
along with profit.235 Perhaps more attention should be focused on 
issues of ownership, voting, and representation.236 If we want 
businesses to reflect the interests of employees, customers, local 
communities, and the environment, giving those stakeholders a 
                                                                                                     
 232. NIEBUHR, MORAL MAN, supra note 26, at 192. 
 233. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (outlining Niebuhr’s concerns 
about the selfishness of human nature).  
 234. See NIEBUHR, MORAL MAN, supra note 26, at xi (arguing that social 
competition can create immorality among even moral individuals); see also 
RAUSCHENBUSCH, SOCIAL CRISIS, supra note 24, at 400–11 (advocating for the 
benefits of a working class movement, as well as a movement to promote 
cooperation between workers and owners). 
 235. See Dana Brakman Reiser, Benefit Corporations—A Sustainable Form 
of Organization?, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 591, 597 (2011) (citing that benefit 
corporation statutes are created for the purpose of allowing entities to pursue 
the general public benefit).  
 236. See generally Brett McDonnell, Benefit Corporations and Public 
Markets: First Experiments and Next Steps, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 263 (2016); 
Alicia E. Plerhoples, Nonprofit Displacement and the Pursuit of Charity 
Through Public Benefit Corporations, GEO. LAW (2016), 
http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/1783.  
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more direct say over decisions, or who makes decisions, may 
make sense, if we cannot trust corporate leaders to adequately 
internalize the interests of others. 
B. Pluralism and Religious Accommodation 
In a world in which regulations have proliferated to address 
a wide variety of harms that business enterprises impose, the 
possibility of businesses pursuing the public good according to 
their own understandings but nonetheless running into conflicts 
with some regulations becomes increasingly common. Both 
government and enterprises pursue many different public goods, 
with varying and sometimes conflicting value systems by which 
they evaluate those goods. When, if ever, should regulations give 
way to allow private organizations to pursue their own versions of 
the good in ways that might conflict with those regulations? 
This question has recently become a highly visible 
controversy for corporations with a religiously-grounded purpose 
following the Supreme Court decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby 
Stores, Inc.237 In that case, a provision of the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act required employers to provide insurance 
coverage for their employees that included providing for 
contraception.238 The plaintiff companies were for-profit 
corporations owned by families with strong religious beliefs 
opposing certain forms of contraception that can function as 
abortifacients.239 The companies sued, invoking the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) to argue that this provision 
substantially burdened their free exercise of religion.240 The 
Court agreed with the plaintiffs, holding that under some 
                                                                                                     
 237. See generally Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 
(2014) (illustrating a clash between the ideals of a government regulation 
mandating certain health-care related packages, and the private corporation’s 
ideals).  
 238. Id. at 2754.  
 239. Id. at 2755; see also Brett H. McDonnell, The Liberal Case for Hobby 
Lobby, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 777, 783–87 (2015) (outlining the legal and factual 
background of the Hobby Lobby case). 
 240. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2754.  
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conditions for-profit business corporations can be persons with 
standing to claim the protections of RFRA.241 
What would our three religious thinkers say about Hobby 
Lobby? Novak’s opinion would seem the easiest to guess.242 Novak 
puts great stress on the importance of pluralism. His pluralism in 
part rests on a healthy respect for diverse beliefs, and the value 
of giving much legal and social space for persons and 
organizations to both express and act upon their individual and 
collective beliefs.243 His pluralism also rests upon a suspicion of 
letting the government have too much power.244 Both grounds 
suggest that Novak would welcome the majority opinion in Hobby 
Lobby.245 
What would Rauschenbusch say about Hobby Lobby? I am 
less sure about him. One variant of the 
communitarian/progressive approach sees corporations as a 
strong source for achieving the public good, in many instances as 
a preferred substitute to regulation.246 Publicly-oriented 
corporations are preferred to regulation in part because of a 
recognition of the existence and validity of plural notions of the 
public good. Lyman Johnson (writing with David Millon) has 
made that argument in support of the Hobby Lobby decision.247 
                                                                                                     
 241. Id. at 2773.  
 242. As Novak died very recently, presumably he in fact had an opinion on 
the Hobby Lobby case itself, unlike Rauschenbusch and Niebuhr (well, I suppose 
I am making assumptions about the consequences of death that perhaps I 
should not be making in a paper on the theology of the corporation). I have been 
unable to find a public expression by Novak on the case, however. 
 243. I find the following quote a quite elegant statement of a religious 
argument for the value of respecting diverse beliefs. “Aquinas once wrote that 
humans are made in the image of God but that since God is infinite He may be 
mirrored only through a virtually infinite number of humans. No concept of Him 
is adequate.” NOVAK, SPIRIT, supra note 17, at 53. 
 244. See id. at 56 (arguing that the division of power between the economic, 
cultural, and governmental system adequately distributes power between the 
three so one system does not overpower the others).  
 245. Although, insofar as Novak supports the shareholder wealth 
maximization norm, that could conceivably push him in the opposite direction. 
See McDonnell, supra note 239, at 790 (illustrating that for-profit corporations 
are only allowed one purpose, to maximize returns for shareholders).  
 246. See RAUSCHENBUSCH, SOCIAL CRISIS, supra note 24, at 402 (arguing that 
promoting cooperation between classes and movement toward social gain can be 
done voluntarily through corporations, rather than through regulation).  
 247. See generally David Millon & Lyman Johnson, Corporate Law After 
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But a different version of the progressive vision puts more 
emphasis on regulation and state action as a way to achieve the 
public good. This version is more skeptical of attempts by 
individual corporations to get out of generally applicable 
regulation. Many progressive corporate law scholars fall within 
this camp and oppose the Hobby Lobby decision.248 Would 
Rauschenbusch side with Johnson and Millon or with the many 
progressive law scholars on the other side of the opinion? I am 
not at all sure, although I suspect his sympathies might lie more 
with the employees potentially denied access to contraceptive 
care rather than with the shareholders wanting to deny that 
access.249 
And what of Niebuhr? There again I am unsure. Might he 
say a pox on both your houses, unhappy with both the wealthy 
shareholder families trying to impose their values on the health 
plans of their employees and also with the politicians and 
government bureaucrats trying to score political points on a 
deeply sensitive moral dilemma? Might he see this as yet another 
example where the egoism of groups clashing in politics creates 
conflict with no good and fair resolution? If so, he would certainly 
have a point.  
Personally, I side with Novak and Johnson on this one. 
RFRA is an important statement of the value of religious liberty 
and diversity of belief and action. In a world of extensive 
regulation covering most elements of business and commerce, 
RFRA provides a safety valve protecting religiously-motivated 
behavior that goes against prevailing moral norms. It expresses 
humility about our ability to craft wise rules in a complex world 
with competing, sometimes irreconcilable visions of the right and 
                                                                                                     
Hobby Lobby, 70 BUS. LAW. 1 (2015). 
 248. This includes many, probably most, of the scholars who signed the Brief 
for Corporate and Criminal Law Professors as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (Nos. 
13-345, 13-356), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/ 
supreme_court_preview/briefs-v3/13-354-13-356_amcu_cclp.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 249. See Grant Hayden & Matthew Bodie, Who Controls Corporate Culture?, 
ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, July 16, 2014, http://www.stltoday.com/ 
news/opinion/columns/who-controls-corporate-culture/article_5dbb9b4c-8c6e-500e-
9c3f-2a2a4abe18c3.html (last visited Apr. 25, 2017) (offering a powerful 
articulation of this perspective) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
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the good. The Hobby Lobby case extends that protection of 
religious exercise to business corporations, thereby recognizing 
that corporations can be not simply profit-making machines, but 
rather organizations devoted to various ideals of the good and 
human flourishing.250 
VI. Conclusion 
We don’t necessarily need to choose. Rauschenbusch, Novak, 
and Niebuhr all provide many insights of much value. We can 
learn from each of them. And there is significant overlap in their 
visions of individuals and society. All understand that human 
beings have a fundamental self-centeredness that we can struggle 
to overcome, individually and within groups, but most of us will 
never fully succeed. Social institutions like the corporation must 
take this egoism into account, while also helping to develop the 
more social elements of our nature. Through both the invisible 
hand of the market and through both enlightened long-run 
self-interest and some other-regarding norms, corporations will 
often act in ways that benefit the public as well as their 
managers and their shareholders. But sometimes they will not, 
and for at least some matters state regulation will be needed to 
limit corporate harms. Of course, our three figures differ 
frequently in how much they emphasize these different points, 
and in the balance of policy choices they advocate.251 
Where they differ, some of their differences may be due to 
when they lived and wrote. Rauschenbusch wrote during the 
height of the initial burst of industrialization in the early 
twentieth century, when society faced many problems, and 
                                                                                                     
 250. See McDonnell, supra note 239, at 809 (arguing that progressive 
corporate law envisions corporations as “ways for like-minded persons to come 
together to pursue shared goals to advance a shared vision of the common good 
in ways to go beyond simply complying with the law”). 
 251. Compare RAUSCHENBUSCH, SOCIAL CRISIS, supra note 24, at 386 
(arguing that state and federal interference with corporations may force 
corporate leaders to become more conscientious and serve the public), with 
NOVAK, SPIRIT, supra note 17, at 93 (reasoning that market forces will weed out 
greedy corporate actors, and that as a result governmental regulation may not 
be effective), and NIEBUHR, MORAL MAN, supra note 26, at 192 (balancing a 
distrust for centralized power and collective action, with a desire to encourage 
cooperative movements). 
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regulation to address those problems was just beginning to be 
enacted. The world as yet had no experience with communism in 
power. Rauschenbusch advocated vigorous action to address 
problems caused by new markets and large corporations, and did 
not dwell on potential downsides to his proposed solutions. 
Niebuhr wrote starting at the beginning of the New Deal, 
continuing through World War II and the post-war era. 
Originally a socialist, he gradually came to support the New Deal, 
in part as it showed success, in part as fascism became a 
dominant threat, and in part in response to the failures of 
communism. Novak wrote his major work in the eighties. The 
failures of communism were impossible to ignore, and the highly 
regulated welfare state was struggling, with political and 
intellectual energy lying with pro-market reformers. 
Which of them has the most to add to thinking about duty 
and purpose in corporate law today? As we have seen repeatedly, 
Rauschenbusch and Novak, for the most part, fit comfortably 
within the communitarian and contractualist approaches, 
respectively, although each has distinctive insights they bring to 
bear within those visions.252 In our time, the pendulum has 
swung from the deregulation trend of the eighties, and economic 
inequality has become a threat closer to what it was in the early 
twentieth century than it has been since World War II ended. All 
that may make Novak’s analysis somewhat dated. And yet, 
neither the socialism nor the worker cooperatives and labor union 
activism that Rauschenbusch championed seem politically viable 
major options in our moment. 
Does Niebuhr present an alternative? He certainly had a 
more unique perspective that does not fit as easily within existing 
approaches to corporate law. His realism that can be somewhat 
hard to distinguish from pessimism seems on point in our time. 
Contractualism and communitarianism, director primacy and 
shareholder primacy, managerialism and shareholder activism—
all have grown intellectually stale, all have serious problems, 
none seem to offer a clear path for an American economy that has 
                                                                                                     
 252. See, e.g., RAUSCHENBUSCH, SOCIAL CRISIS, supra note 24, at 370 
(endorsing the communitarian vision of corporate purpose, namely that profit 
seeking should not come before health and wellness); see also NOVAK, SPIRIT, 
supra note 17, at 93 (arguing that successful management will draw out ideals 
of teamwork, cooperation, and creativity).  
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become less innovative, offers less robust job growth, and spurred 
a growing divide between the very rich and everyone else. 
Niebuhr suggests deep skepticism that markets, morals, or 
fiddling with corporate law rules within the existing structure of 
business corporations are likely to move us very far in pushing 
business enterprises to more actively pursue the public 
interest.253 
Less stale is the movement towards social enterprise, 
including new legal forms like the benefit corporation. But here 
too, Niebuhr (and to a significant extent Rauschenbusch as well) 
suggests that the focus so far has been too much on fiddling with 
the rules of corporate purpose and duty.254 We should instead be 
looking at voting and representation: who has actual authority, or 
the ability to choose those with actual authority, in a corporation? 
What might than mean? 
That’s a topic for another day. 
                                                                                                     
 253. See supra note 106 and accompanying text (discussing that law is 
perhaps an inadequate approach to making business enterprises actively pursue 
the public good because the immorality of man can and will leech into the law 
itself).  
 254. See RAUSCHENBUSCH, SOCIAL CRISIS, supra note 24, at 406–07 
(discussing the two-class system of modern capitalism); see also NIEBUHR, 
MORAL MAN, supra note 26, at 60 (arguing that self interest, greed, and pride 
are too deeply engrained into human character to be rooted out by laws and 
regulations).  
